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1I. INTRODUCTION 
In the age of global trade through online commercial transactions, privacy is 
becoming a major issue in relation to the dissemination and protection of personal data. 
In the context of trade relations between the United States and the European Union 
(“EU”), online privacy issues are emerging in light of the widespread differences in 
privacy regulation between the two entities. These differences involve compliance with 
privacy standards relating to the protection of personal data. 
Privacy regimes among various nations exist in either a comprehensive or sectoral 
fashion. Under Directive 95/46 EC (“Directive”), the EU employs a comprehensive 
approach that binds all EU member states to implement “adequate” protections of 
personal data used in commercial transactions.1 In contrast, the U.S. employs a sectoral 
approach that involves less privacy protections.2  U.S. companies engaging in online 
commerce with the EU are thus facing increasingly rigorous compliance standards. If 
such EU standards are not met by a U.S. company, penalties in the form of legal 
enforcement actions may result. 
With regard to online commercial transactions, the EU utilizes strict privacy 
standards for non-EU entities accessing personal data from EU member states. The 
reason for introducing such standards is to curb misuse of personal data belonging to EU 
parties. Having extensive trade links with a dynamic and increasingly wired EU market, 
the U.S. is expressing concern over potential disruptions in trade that would impact 
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2significantly on U.S commerce. This is because U.S. companies must comply with more 
rigorous privacy standards as set in the Directive. In allaying these fears, the U.S. and the 
EU conducted negotiations, resulting in the Safe Harbor agreement (“Safe Harbor”).3
Using the Directive’s principles, the Safe Harbor creates a scheme by which U.S. 
companies comply with stricter privacy standards relating to the transfer of online 
personal data. With respect to U.S. privacy law, this Safe Harbor regime substitutes the 
predominant sectoral approach for a more comprehensive approach. Comprehensiveness 
within the U.S. privacy regime is gathering momentum partly due to the influences of 
both the Directive and Safe Harbor. As part of this comprehensive regime, U.S. federal 
agencies act as enforcement authorities in monitoring those U.S. companies collecting 
personal data from consumers.
This paper argues that five factors create momentum in gradually shifting U.S. 
privacy laws towards a comprehensive regime: (a) the influence of the Directive; (b) the 
influence of the Safe Harbor; (c) increasing recognition by Congress that American 
consumers need more privacy protections; (d) increased privacy protections by States; 
and (e) concerns over potential disruptions in U.S-EU trade relations. Much of this paper 
will describe how the Safe Harbor draws from the Directive’s principles in fostering 
comprehensiveness among companies involved in the program.
II. COMPREHENSIVE VS. SECTORAL APPROACHES 
 Privacy approaches between the U.S. and the EU differ substantially. Using the 
Directive, the EU approach involves comprehensive privacy protections for consumers 
3 Id.
3and businesses transferring personal data.4 Comprehensive protections refer to a broad 
scheme of enforcing strict privacy standards (“adequate protection”) that combines all 
aspects of privacy law found in various industries under one overarching regime.5 Within 
the EU, this regime requires all member states to follow general principles of privacy 
protection (espoused under the Directive) by adopting similar forms of legislation to aid 
enforcement. The implementation of comprehensive protections involves cooperation 
between EU authorities and private industry in order to maintain consistent privacy 
standards. An essential feature of comprehensive protections includes rights of redress for 
parties whose personal data are mishandled by companies not complying with such 
consistent standards. Thus, comprehensive protections obligate all member states to 
implement specific rules for entities transferring any personal data.6
An example of a Directive’s specific rule meeting the “adequate” protection 
standard is when a party must disclose its own identity and information practices to 
individuals interested in presenting personal data.7  Personal data generally include an 
individual’s name, home and e-mail address, telephone and social security number, and 
credit card number.8  Individual enforcement authorities known as Data Protection 
Authorities (“DPAs”) oversee this standard throughout the EU.9  The DPAs are 
4
 International Trade Administration  (Department of Commerce), Safe Harbor Overview, in Rebecca 
Herold, The Privacy Papers 619, 620 (CRC Press LLC 2002) [hereinafter International Trade 
Administration].
5 Id.
6
 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 1, available at <http://www.cdt.org/privacy/eudirective/EU_Directive_.html> 
(last visited March 31, 2003).
7
 Jordan M. Blanke, “Safe Harbor” and the European Union’s Directive on Data Protection, 11 Alb. L.J. 
Sci. & Tech. 57, 63 (2000).
8 Id.
9 Deparment of Commerce, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) FAQ 5 The Role of the Data Protection 
Authorities, available at <http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/FAQ5-DPAFINAL.htm> (last visited March 
23, 2003) [hereinafter DOC FAQ 5].
4authorized entities meant to ensure that the Directive’s privacy standards are met within 
each EU member state, while also investigating and resolving privacy disputes.10
Under Article 28(1), the Directive delegates broad powers to the DPAs in 
completely restricting personal data flow between an EU entity and a U.S. entity when a 
privacy violation is committed.11   Furthermore, if a U.S. company does not comply with 
advice given by a DPA to conform to “adequate” protections of personal data, the DPA 
will notify the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) or other U.S. federal or state bodies 
with statutory powers to take enforcement actions.12  The Directive also bestows 
substantial authority upon the DPAs to enforce privacy standards that are even more 
rigorous than the Directive itself.13
In contrast to the comprehensive approach, the U.S. follows a sectoral approach. 
The sectoral approach refers to a privacy scheme whereby federal and state governments 
regulate standards within specified sectors of the economy.14  The U.S. privacy regime is 
sectoral in nature because privacy regulation involves a mix of federal/state legislation 
and self-regulation.15  Whereas federal and state statutes govern the extent of personal 
data transfer under specific circumstances, self-regulation generally refers to U.S. 
companies enforcing their own privacy standards with little government involvement, but 
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5providing for some means of consumer redress.16 A drawback with the sectoral approach 
is that it is difficult to enforce uniform privacy standards knowing that other industries 
not within the purview of government regulation have different standards. This makes it 
difficult to establish baseline privacy standard s from which consumers and businesses 
alike can follow. But, with the growing influence of the Directive in terms of personal 
data transfer between EU and U.S. entities, this sectoral regime is gradually being 
replaced by self-regulation under a more elaborate scheme of monitoring personal data 
compliance. 
Traditionally, privacy statutes were introduced by Congress to establish controls 
over the handling of consumer personal data by governmental sources rather than private 
entities. In recent times, however, Congress recognizes that American consumers are 
concerned about personal data protection from private sources. That is, American 
consumers feel that this sectoral approach does little to protect online personal data.17  In 
gaining a sense of this concern, a project known as the Georgetown Internet Privacy 
Policy Survey revealed that 92.8% of U.S. commercial websites (randomly selected out 
of 361 websites) contained some type of personal identifying information, such as e-mail 
and postal address.18
(A) THE U.S. APPROACH PRIOR TO THE DIRECTIVE: COPPA AND THE FTC 
Ensuring that privacy compliance exists requires legitimate enforcement from 
recognized authorities. Before the Directive, privacy enforcement in the U.S. was carried 
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6through the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”).19 Introduced by 
Congress in 1998, COPPA affords personal data protections similar to that of the 
Directive, but specifically for children using the Internet.20   COPPA requires company 
websites receiving personal data from children under the age of 13 to post a privacy 
policy detailing the personal data they collect from young visitors.21  Here, the protected 
information relates to user registration, or personal data that children reveal in chat rooms 
or posting services.22 The website must also have a parental notification-and-approval 
policy in place.23
Enforcement of COPPA regulations was successfully administered by the FTC in 
fining San Francisco-based LookSmart Ltd. for $35,000 in redirecting visitors to a 
different site owned by the company.24  The FTC argued that LookSmart Ltd. illegally 
collected personal data from children without getting permission from their parents.25
Furthermore, the FTC noted that the LookSmart Ltd. website posted no privacy policy as 
required by COPPA.26 COPPA thus illustrates how the FTC plays an active role in 
enforcing broader privacy protections within a U.S sectoral regime prior to the Directive. 
By fining U.S. companies for misusing personal data of American consumers, the FTC 
19
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7demonstrates its commitment in targeting U.S. companies for privacy violations relating
to online commercial transactions. 
(B) THE EU DATA PRIVACY DIRECTIVE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON U.S. BUSINESSES 
 
Since the 1970s, EU member states are utilizing comprehensive privacy standards 
to safeguard European consumers and businesses.27  Because EU member states initially
followed a sectoral approach for personal data protection, the EU introduced stronger 
measures in the Directive to establish an over-arching privacy regime.28 Initially 
proposed by the EU in 1995 and later adopted in 1998, the Directive provides a 
harmonized set of privacy standards within all industries that ensure the free flow of 
personal data between EU member states.29
 Through Article 25, the Directive also creates specific guidelines in regulating 
the export of personal data from EU states to “third countries” only when such countries 
meet “adequate” protection standards.30  Adequate privacy refers to compliance with 
strict standards set forth by the Directive whereby non-EU entities are required to provide 
personal data protections to EU entities supplying such data.31  This compliance 
mechanism is influencing a change among U.S. businesses with regard to the handling of 
personal data. Realizing that EU privacy violations are enforced under the watchful eye 
of DPAs, U.S. companies hope to avoid a disruption in online personal data transfers 
during relevant transactions. In this regard, the Directive is compelling U.S businesses to 
27
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8embrace EU-like privacy standards, and thereby modify their own personal data 
collection practices. As one commentator notes: 
The impact of the EU Directive demonstrates that the actions of other 
powerful states also shape U.S. regulation and business practice. Although 
the scope and content of U.S. regulation of data privacy protection depend
substantially on domestic factors, EU regulatory policy significantly 
affects the playing field in the United States … External pressures from 
the European Union enhance the impact of U.S. internal pressures. The 
EU Directive prods U.S. businesses to change their behavior to avoid 
confrontations with EU regulators. It prompts U.S. legislators to press 
U.S. businesses to enhance their internal standards to avoid a regulatory 
conflict.32
The influence of the Directive upon U.S. privacy law is apparent in that a 
comprehensive regime with strict standards is finding its way into a sectoral regime. As 
one commentator states: “The European Directive exerts significant pressure on U.S. 
information rights, practices, and policies. The Directive facilitates a single information 
market place within Europe through a harmonized set of rules, but also forces scrutiny of 
U.S. data privacy.”33  With billions of dollars being exchanged in online transactions 
between companies in the EU and the U.S., it follows that non-compliance would prevent 
the flow of streamlined transactions. Another commentator illustrates the Directive’s 
influence on U.S. privacy law in terms of impacting trade relations: “Brussels has gone so 
far as to give an ultimatum to Washington: adopt strong privacy laws, or stand the risk of 
losing countless trillions of dollars of business with Europe.”34
Since U.S. businesses are accustomed to sectoral privacy laws with little oversight 
from a central enforcement authority, the challenge is to rearrange their methods of 
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9collecting personal data by guaranteeing “adequate” protection for EU entities. 
Conforming to such standards serves the dual purpose of helping U.S. companies avoid 
facing EU legal enforcement action, while preserving existing business contacts within 
the EU. To meet these challenges, it would be essential to find an appropriate 
compromise to resolve the U.S.- EU privacy regime differences. 
III. ENTER THE SAFE HARBOR: ACTING AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR 
COMPREHENSIVENESS IN THE U.S. 
 
With different privacy regimes in place, the U.S. struck a political compromise 
with the EU to ease concerns expressed by both entities over potential disruptions in trade 
relations. This compromise known as the Safe Harbor is gradually incorporating 
comprehensive privacy standards (derived from the Directive) into a U.S sectoral-based 
system. The Directive influences the Safe Harbor by furnishing broad standards of 
“adequate” protections. Because of its nature as a voluntary agreement and not as official 
law, the Safe Harbor does not bind all U.S. states to embrace comprehensive privacy 
standards. However, on the corporate level the Safe Harbor replaces the sectoral approach 
with a comprehensive approach by requiring company compliance with specific 
principles of “adequate” protections of personal data. In this way, the Safe Harbor acts as 
an important precursor to the development of comprehensive laws within the U.S. private 
sector by emphasizing compliance with stricter privacy standards. 
This Safe Harbor agreement was successfully negotiated between the Department 
of Commerce (“DOC”) and the European Commission in July 2000.35  A statement made 
by Robert LaRussa, the Acting Under Secretary of the International Trade 
35
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Administration, amply illustrates the overall purpose of the Safe Harbor: “The safe 
harbor is a landmark accord for e-commerce. It bridges the differences between EU and 
U.S. approaches to privacy protection and will ensure that data flows between the U.S. 
and the EU are not interrupted. As a result, it should help ensure that e-commerce 
continues to flourish.”36
The Safe Harbor is thus a means for streamlining commercial activity using 
online personal data protections as a means for U.S. businesses to satisfy EU-like 
“adequacy” requirements. The link between the Directive and the Safe Harbor is that U.S. 
companies voluntarily joining the Safe Harbor are required to follow seven principles 
(“Principles”) when transferring personal data with EU entities: (1) Notice; (2) Choice; 
(3) Onward Transfer; (4) Security; (5) Data Integrity; (6) Access; and (7) Enforcement.37
Notice has three functions: (a) it informs the individual as to the purpose for which the 
data is being used; (b) it provides a means to contact companies for inquiries or 
complaints; and (c) it gives information on the types of third parties who have access to 
the personal data held by the online provider.38
Choice offers individuals the chance to: (a) ‘opt out’ if personal data is disclosed 
to a third party, or used for a purpose other than which it is originally intended; and (b) 
‘opt-in’ for sensitive personal data (i.e. health, ethnic origin) which is disclosed to third 
parties.39 Onward Transfer allows the transfer of personal data to third parties acting as 
an agent for the company collecting the data, provided that the company ensures that the 
36
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agent complies with the Principles or is subject to the Directive.40 Security requires 
companies to take reasonable precautions to protect personal data from loss, misuse, 
unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration, or destruction.41
Data integrity requires that personal data be relevant for the purpose for which it 
is to be used.42 Access allows individuals to review company records to correct, amend, 
or delete personal data that is inaccurate or too sensitive in nature.43 Finally, enforcement 
demands that companies provide recourse mechanisms for individuals to resolve privacy 
disputes, and award damages.44 These seven Principles represent a baseline standard from 
which U.S. companies collecting personal data from EU entities must follow to meet the 
“adequate” protection standard. Any U.S. company receiving personal data from an EU 
party without abiding by these Principles may face legal enforcement action either by a 
U.S. or EU authority, which may result in a court awarding damages to the EU party.45
More importantly, however, personal data collected by U.S. companies during a 
commercial transaction will be terminated by U.S. or EU enforcement authorities.46
(A) DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVENESS: STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE 
SAFE HARBOR 
 
The structural arrangement of the Safe Harbor allows U.S. federal agencies to 
formally embody comprehensive standards similar to that of EU authorities. At the onset 
of joining the Safe Harbor, U.S. companies may choose between FTC or DPA
40 Id.
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42
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enforcement for resolving privacy disputes. This manner of choosing bolsters the FTC’s 
ability to enforce “adequate” protection standards within the U.S. The FTC takes on a 
role similar to that of the DPA by ensuring that companies handling personal data during 
commercial transactions meet the “adequate” protection standard.
By providing a choice between using either FTC or DPA enforcement 
mechanisms, the Safe Harbor invites U.S. companies to provide their own enforcement 
mechanisms (normally used in a sectoral approach) in order to meet the “adequate” 
standard. Although such an arrangement merges a sectoral-based principle with an EU 
requirement, the Safe Harbor still manages to incorporate some elements of a 
comprehensive scheme into a sectoral regime. Over time, U.S. companies familiarize 
themselves with such stricter privacy standards.
(B) DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVENESS WITHIN U.S. COMPANIES: SELF-
REGULATION AND SELF-CERTIFICATION 
 
Ensuring that “adequate” privacy protections are enforced within the Safe Harbor, 
Self-regulation and self-certification are two methods of achieving this goal. When EU 
parties complain about the content and use of personal data, U.S. companies utilize 
specific procedures in a process known as self-regulation.47 Self-regulation allows U.S. 
companies to create an independent means for resolving privacy disputes with EU 
parties, such as with dispute resolution.48  If a U.S. company commits a privacy violation, 
an EU party is encouraged to settle the dispute within the U.S.49  Thus, self-regulation 
47 Id. at 69.
48 Id. at 70.
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provides a means to enforce “adequate” privacy protections with little governmental 
involvement.50
Apart from the Safe Harbor, the most common form of self-regulation in the U.S. 
involves online privacy seal programs, such as TRUSTe and BBBOnline.51  The link 
between such programs and the Safe Harbor is that the seal programs assist U.S. 
companies in creating privacy policy statements that resemble Safe Harbor-like privacy 
standards.52 The Safe Harbor uses these forms of self-regulation as part of its scheme to 
merge the traditionally U.S. sectoral approach within a more comprehensive EU-like 
regime. The incorporation of this procedure denotes flexibility in enforcement.
 However, a major criticism regarding online privacy seal programs relates to 
implementation.53  Pursuant to the Online Privacy and Disclosure Act of 2000, such 
programs normally display a distinct privacy seal on a U.S. company’s website to prove 
that it is complying with the Principles.54  The seal programs alert the EU consumer as to 
the information practices used by a U.S. company during an online commercial 
transaction. But the problem with seal programs, as indicated in a 2000 FTC Report to 
Congress, is that “[t]he seal programs have yet to establish a significant presence on the 
Web.”55
 Recently, however, more seal programs are being found on U.S. commercial 
websites. For instance, a seal program on the FTC’s website shows a “Dewie e-Turtle” 
50
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privacy seal.56 The “Dewie” initiative encourages U.S. consumers and businesses to
review FTC recommendations to safeguard personal data.57  The FTC website also 
contains links to other privacy protection sites such as the National Cyber Security 
Alliance’s StaySafeOnline.info.58 The growth of website seal programs demonstrates the 
level of commitment by U.S. entities (like the FTC) to promote personal data protection 
schemes among American consumers and businesses.
The other means of joining the Safe Harbor is self-certification.59 Under self-
certification, a U.S. company sends a letter to the DOC stating its intent to voluntarily 
join the Safe Harbor, while also agreeing to cooperate with the DPAs in the event an
investigation of privacy disputes is brought by EU parties.60  This is an annual 
certification process assuring the DOC that a U.S. company will adhere to Safe Harbor 
privacy standards for personal data collection.61
By publicly declaring its intent to join the Safe Harbor, a U.S. company also 
agrees to post a detailed privacy policy statement on its website that purports to comply
with “adequate” standards.62 Nevertheless, U.S. companies are concerned about facing 
legal actions over privacy violations that they unknowingly commit under the Safe 
Harbor. Upon joining the Safe Harbor, U.S. companies may use either FTC or EU 
56
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enforcement bodies to resolve privacy disputes in case their own dispute resolution 
mechanisms do not suffice.63
Regardless of whether or not self-regulation or self-certification resolves a 
privacy dispute, these procedures involve significant contact with both U.S. and EU 
authorities. This system of administration ensures the implementation of more 
comprehensive privacy protection standards within the U.S by holding U.S. companies 
accountable for their actions. That is, when U.S. companies voluntarily join the Safe 
Harbor but commit privacy violations, little can be done to escape liability knowing that 
U.S. federal agencies and EU authorities are directly involved in overseeing compliance. 
In this sense, the Safe Harbor mimics the style of EU compliance for “adequate” 
protection.
(C) DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVENESS:  SAFE HARBOR REQUIREMENTS 
Complying with the Safe Harbor’s general requirements signals a U.S company’s 
intent to meet EU adequacy requirements relating to personal data protections. If a U.S. 
company voluntarily joins the Safe Harbor, it must follow five general guidelines.64 First, 
the company must comply with all seven Principles.65 Second, it must review the fifteen 
frequently asked questions (“FAQs”) prepared by the DOC.66 Third, it must certify to the 
DOC that it has implemented the Principles, either publicly in the form of “self-
63
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certification” or through “self-regulation”.67 Fourth, it must have available appropriate 
enforcement mechanisms, along with an independent third-party dispute resolution 
mechanism for privacy violations.68 Fifth, it must continue complying with the Principles 
in good faith while participating throughout the Safe Harbor program.69
These requirements illustrate the commitment involved in joining a 
comprehensive regime like the Safe Harbor. Modifying data collection practices to 
conform to the Principles requires an understanding and acceptance of more 
comprehensive privacy laws designed to permit a highly regulated form of online 
commercial transactions. Cooperation with the DOC for reviewing FAQs and the 
notification requirement encourages a U.S. company to form a unique partnership with 
federal authorities. This partnership bears a striking resemblance to an EU entities’ close 
dealings with a DPA. Since the sectoral approach has no such partnership, it follows that 
the Safe Harbor seems to foster a comprehensive-like approach by promoting cooperation 
between government and private industry in the scope of Safe Harbor privacy 
compliance.
(D) DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVENESS: PRIVACY WEST AND DIRECT 
MARKETING ASSOCIATION 
 
The Safe Harbor’s influence in promoting comprehensiveness not only extends to 
Safe Harbor companies but also to the U.S. private industry, thereby encouraging U.S. 
companies to join the Safe Harbor. Companies are establishing various websites as a 
means to ensure compliance with EU adequacy standards. For example, Privacy West is a 
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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California business specializing in helping small to medium size businesses with Safe 
Harbor privacy compliance.70  Realizing that companies are concerned over the costs 
associated with meeting Safe Harbor requirements, Privacy West creates practical 
methods for U.S. companies to establish privacy policies that conform to the Principles. 
Such methods include step-by-step instructions on how U.S. companies can self-regulate 
instead of self-certifying with the DOC.71
Other U.S. companies are actively promoting “adequacy” standards via the Safe 
Harbor. For instance, the Direct Marketing Association (“DMA”), the largest trade 
association for U.S. businesses involved in global marketing, operates a DMA Safe 
Harbor Program (“DMASHP”).72   DMA members include, among others, AT&T, IBM, 
the New York Times, and Proctor & Gamble.73  This program helps DMA members 
create privacy policies on websites that conform to all Safe Harbor Principles.74
This program also helps U.S. companies by providing independent third-party 
dispute resolution mechanisms.75  This type of assistance fulfills one of the five Safe 
Harbor general guidelines requiring companies to seek third-party dispute resolution 
mechanisms when privacy complaints are lodged against them by EU entities. The 
DMA’s dispute resolution body satisfies EU entities by providing: (1) fair and unbiased 
70
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decision-making; (2) an accessible means of filing a complaint; (3) resolution of a dispute 
in a timely manner; and (4) certainty in enforcing legal actions.76
The DMA also has a “Safe Harbor Line”, which is a free consumer service 
offering advice on matters relating to privacy disputes between EU entities and U.S. 
companies.77   In this way, U.S. companies educate the general public about unfamiliar 
privacy standards. If there is no resolution on a matter, the Safe Harbor Line staff directs 
EU consumer complaints to the DMA’s Safe Harbor Program Committee for review.78
This committee is composed of direct marketing experts and recognized consumer 
representatives.79
If this DMA body finds that a U.S. company clearly violates a Safe Harbor 
Principle, it may notify such a violation to the FTC and DOC, who then take appropriate 
legal action.80 Moreover, sanctions are imposed on such U.S. companies by: (1) 
correcting or deleting inaccurate personal information; (2) reimbursing direct monetary 
damages to consumers; (3) suspending the company from the DMA Safe Harbor 
Program; and (4) generating publicity for non-compliance.81  Once again, a unique 
mechanism of cooperation exists between a U.S. company and a federal agency (much 
like the EU privacy regime) in regulating strict privacy standards. The DMA program 
illustrates how one U.S. company supplements “adequate” privacy compliance in other 
U.S. companies.  
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The legal authority in the DMA Safe Harbor Program Committee derives from 
specific provisions in a contract.82   For example, the DMA Safe Harbor Program 
Contract under section 9 notes: 
Participant’s failure to comply with any and all remedies resulting from 
the DMASHP may, pursuant to the Safe Harbor, result in The DMA’s 
notifying any known governmental entity or other self-regulation program 
in any country, including without limitation the Attorney General of any 
State, the United States Federal Trade Commission, any law enforcement 
agency, any other state or federal governmental agency with jurisdiction 
over this matter, or any foreign privacy authority or other foreign 
government authority, of Participant’s non-compliance.83
The DMA program thus illustrates how legally binding obligations are imposed 
by the Safe Harbor on U.S. businesses. The language of the DMA contract suggests that 
not only will a U.S. company be disciplined by various U.S. federal authorities, but also 
by governments and foreign privacy authorities “in any country”.  The contract also 
indicates a close partnership that exists between the U.S. federal government, private 
industry, and foreign governments in promoting “adequate” privacy compliance. By 
providing assistance to U.S. companies not familiar with comprehensive privacy 
protections for personal data, the DMA program acts as a conduit for U.S. companies 
willing to conduct online commercial transactions with EU entities, while limiting the 
risk of committing privacy violations. 
IV. INCENTIVE FOR U.S. COMPANIES TO JOIN THE SAFE HARBOR: TRADE RELATIONS 
 
To gain a sense of the economic impact that privacy compliance has upon trade 
relations, trade in personal data between the U.S. and the EU in 2000 was valued at $120 
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83
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billion.84  The Safe Harbor’s impact upon commercial activities within the U.S. acts as a 
warning for U.S. companies who resist changing current personal data collection 
practices when dealing with EU entities. Although U.S. companies are taking an 
understandably cautious approach in deciding whether or not to join the Safe Harbor, 
other companies such as IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Microsoft are active participants in 
the program, giving them considerable leverage in an enlarging EU market.85  It follows 
that in order to remain competitive in the EU market, U.S. companies must change their 
own data collection practices to comply with more comprehensive privacy standards.  
Not making these changes will affect their ability to transfer personal data necessary for 
commercial transactions.
Having U.S. companies comply with the Safe Harbor restores confidence in EU 
entities that suggests the U.S. is making a concerted effort to improve and actively 
enforce more comprehensive privacy standards. Joining the Safe Harbor also creates a 
presumption that U.S. companies provide “adequate” protection, as espoused under 
Article 25 of the Directive.86  With the EU market representing almost 500 million 
citizens, U.S. companies are eager to maintain, if not increase, trade relations with the EU 
by actively promoting comprehensive privacy compliance. Aside from trade relations, the 
U.S. is also recognizing how personal data is becoming a sensitive issue among 
American consumers - one that impacts local online commerce. Congress reiterates this 
point by noting that: “Market research demonstrates that tens of billions of dollars in e-
84
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commerce are lost due to individual fears about a lack of privacy protection on the 
Internet.”87
V. THE SAFE HARBOR AS A SUBSTITUTE AND PRECURSOR FOR COMPREHENSIVENESS 
IN THE U.S. 
 
Congress recognizes the need to introduce an overarching privacy regime. Even 
prior to the Safe Harbor, U.S. legislators felt that more concrete privacy laws should be 
enacted for the benefit of American consumers. Congress summarizes this sentiment in 
the Electronic Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 1999 by noting that: “A national privacy 
policy that relies in part upon industry self-regulatory initiatives, technological tools for 
consumers, and Government-backed protections is needed to foster future development 
of electronic commerce and to safeguard the essential rights of individuals with respect to 
collection and use of their personal data.”88
Although the Safe Harbor is an attempt to resolve privacy regime differences 
between the U.S. and the EU, it establishes a baseline from which Congress can adopt 
more comprehensive privacy laws. This can be achieved by using the Principles as a 
common standard for individual states to safeguard personal data of consumers. Although 
privacy enforcement in the U.S is administered primarily through self-regulation in the 
private sector, a noticeable partnership is developing between the U.S. government and 
U.S. private entities to improve privacy compliance. As the DOC notes: “Private sector 
87
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self regulation and enforcement will be backed up as needed by government enforcement 
of the federal and state unfair and deceptive statutes.”89
That is, if EU entities are dissatisfied with U.S. private sector enforcement for 
privacy violations, the U.S. government remains committed to carry through on the 
enforcement process. Considering that various U.S. state legislatures are adopting privacy 
laws in accordance with Safe Harbor-like standards, it appears that U.S. privacy law is 
being shaped in accordance with privacy standards in the Directive. Introducing 
comprehensive privacy measures illustrates the effort to administer greater privacy 
protections for U.S. entities, while ensuring streamlined commerce with EU entities. In 
the context of online commercial activity, the generous protections afforded by the Safe 
Harbor to EU entities beyond its jurisdiction influences the U.S. approach to adopt 
similar protections for American entities. 
(A) DRAWING FROM THE DIRECTIVE: OPPA 
Remedies function as a means to encourage U.S. companies to comply with strict 
privacy controls for personal data collection. The Safe Harbor prompted the U.S. to 
introduce legislation to provide compensation for U.S. citizens affected by privacy 
violations. The Online Personal Privacy Act of 2002 (“OPPA”) grants remedies to 
American consumers who provide personal data to U.S. companies that fall short of 
providing “adequate” privacy protection.90
89
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The OPPA distinguishes between sensitive and non-sensitive information.91 For 
sensitive information (such as financial data, health records, ethnicity, or sexual 
orientation), the OPPA grants a private right of action in a U.S. district court if an internet 
service provider or commercial website operator inappropriately discloses such 
information.92  Upon a showing of actual harm, an individual may recover monetary 
losses or $5000.93   For repeated privacy violations of sensitive information, OPPA gives 
wide discretion to courts for increasing the amount of damages, but not in excess of 
$100,000.94
A comparison between the Directive and OPPA reveals how online providers are 
required to follow notice and consent requirements when handling personal data of users. 
For instance, Article 7 of the Directive states: “Member States shall provide that personal 
data may be processed only if: (a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent . 
. . .”
95
  Under Section 102(b) of OPPA, “An internet service provider, online service 
provider, or operator of a commercial website may not – (1) collect sensitive personally 
identifiable information online, or (2) disclose . . . such information collected online, 
from a user of that service or website, unless the provider or operator obtains that user’s 
consent . . .”96
OPPA thus demonstrates how Congress draws from the Directive to ensure 
“adequate” protection of personal data for U.S. citizens. As one speaker indicates in an 
OPPA Senate floor statement: “In this respect, the legislation is also similar to the two-
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tiered approach taken by the European Union in which companies are required to provide 
baseline protections governing the use of non-sensitive information, and stronger consent 
protections governing the use of sensitive data.”97  This recognition by U.S. legislators 
for providing greater personal data protections for U.S. citizens is another instance that 
stronger privacy measures are being incorporated within U.S. privacy law. 
(B) DRAWING FROM THE DIRECTIVE: CPPA  
 
Aside from OPPA, other privacy statutes passed by Congress reveal a trend 
towards adopting comprehensive privacy standards. For instance, the Consumer Privacy 
Protection Act of 2000 (“CPPA”) establishes privacy protections for online personal data 
by drawing statutory language from the Directive.98  For instance, a striking similarity 
exists between the Directive and the CPPA regarding the Principle of Access.  Under 
Article 12 of the Directive (Right of Access), “Member States shall guarantee every data 
right to obtain from the controller:  .  .  . (b) as appropriate the rectification, erasure or 
blocking of data the processing of which does not comply with the provisions of this 
Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data.”99
Likewise, under Section 102(c) of the CPPA (Access), “[a]n Internet service 
provider, online service provider, or operator of a commercial website shall … (2) 
provide a reasonable opportunity for a user to correct, delete, or supplement any such 
information maintained by that provider or operator;”100  The similarity between the 
97 Id.
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Directive and the CPPA exists in the statutory language such that online service providers 
are required to permit consumers to access and modify personal data. Both statutes grant 
the consumer considerable power to control the content and transfer of personal data 
during online commercial transactions.
The CPPA contributes to comprehensiveness in the U.S. by raising awareness to 
both the FTC and Congress about the growing importance of privacy protections 
affecting American consumers. For instance, section 307 of the CPPA requires the FTC 
to establish an Office of Online Privacy to study privacy issues related to e-commerce and 
the Internet.101  This body submits annual reports to the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, as well as the House of Representatives Committee on 
Commerce.102 The Office of Online Privacy also recommends additional privacy 
legislation to Congress.103 This process ensures that Congress is aware of concerns 
addressed by American consumers over privacy protections, while also signaling the need 
to promulgate stricter standards within the U.S. 
Realizing that the FTC actively enforces comprehensive privacy standards, 
Congress is certainly attentive of consumer complaints of online privacy protections. In 
the context of the CPPA, Congress notes that: “[p]rivacy safeguards should be applied 
uniformly across different communications media so as to provide consistent consumer 
privacy protections.”104  In efforts to study online privacy issues affecting Americans, 
101 Id. at 35.
102 Id.
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Congress established a bi-partisan group known as the Congressional Privacy Caucus in 
February 2000 (“Caucus”).105
The Caucus seeks to educate members of Congress on privacy issues such as 
consent, unauthorized access to personal data, and basic privacy protections for online 
commercial activity.106  The Caucus also holds forums and discussion panels with 
privacy advocates and Internet companies to address privacy issues in the hopes of 
making important legislative proposals.107  For instance, the issue of web bugs is 
eliciting the Caucus to question the use of invisible tracking methods to determine online 
transactional behavior.108   To counter what it sees as a blatant misuse of such data, the 
Caucus seeks laws that limit the manner in which online companies gather and exchange 
personal data.109
(C) CONTRIBUTING TO COMPREHENSIVENESS: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
 
Extraordinary changes led by the FTC are shaping U.S. privacy laws to 
encompass broader privacy standards. In November 1999, a joint effort between the FTC 
and DOC resulted in presenting a public workshop on “online profiling” by third-party 
advertisers.110   This workshop educates the public about privacy issues, while also 
105
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highlighting fair information practices in the scope of online advertising.111 In December 
1999, the FTC assembled an Advisory Committee on Online Access and Security, 
consisting of industry representatives, security specialists, and consumer and privacy 
advocates.112  Convening in public meetings, this body advises the FTC about fair 
information practice principles within the U.S.113
In applying practical enforcement measures, the FTC identifies five core 
principles of privacy protection, as derived from the Organization of Economic and 
Cooperation of Development (OECD) Guidelines and the Directive.114  These principles 
include: (1) Notice/Awarness; (2) Choice/Consent; (3) Access/Participation; (4) 
Integrity/Security; and (5) Enforcement/Redress.115  If a U.S. company adheres to these 
five principles, the FTC labels such compliance as a “fair information practice”.116  This 
form of compliance amounts to the “adequate” protection standard as defined by the 
Directive. 
During privacy disputes under the Safe Harbor, a decision favoring an EU entity 
upon a showing that a U.S. company continually violates the “adequate” protection 
standard results in the case being brought under the FTC’s jurisdiction.117  Here, due 
process is afforded to the non-compliant U.S. company, but this company is immediately 
dropped from the Safe Harbor.118  The consequence of such action is that the company 
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puts itself into disrepute with the FTC, DOC, and EU entities. This puts a company at a 
disadvantage in terms of collecting personal data securely from EU sources. If an EU 
party learns of a company’s failure to meet the “adequate” protection standard because it 
is dropped from the Safe Harbor, any correspondence made by this company may be 
blocked by an appropriate DPA. Thus, the ability to conduct online commerce with EU 
parties affects the business prospects of any non-compliant U.S. company doing business 
in the EU.
A similarity exists between the EU and the U.S. in terms of the structural 
arrangement of privacy authorities. Under Article 29 of the Directive, an advisory group 
known as the “Working Party” oversees the protection of consumers’ personal data with 
regard to online commercial activities.119  The Working Party ensures uniform privacy 
compliance in each EU member state, and is required by the EU Commission to submit 
annual reports regarding the status of personal data protections.120
The analogous U.S. enforcement body for privacy compliance is the FTC. Like 
the Working Party, the FTC submits annual reports to legislative bodies on privacy 
protection standards.121  Many of the FTC’s findings relate to consumer privacy issues.122
For instance, a 2002 FTC Report reveals that up to $18 billion is lost in online retail due 
to data privacy concerns expressed by American consumers.123 Such findings are enough 
to compel Congress to introduce legislation that safeguards personal data of American 
119
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consumers. The FTC thus demonstrates how its monitoring of compliance standards 
within the U.S. helps prod legislative changes to the existing privacy regime. 
(D) CONTRIBUTING TO COMPREHENSIVENESS: THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
 
The DOC is a key federal agency in helping the FTC regulate online privacy in 
the U.S. The DOC’s commitment to ensuring “adequate” privacy protection is amply 
illustrated in a formal letter sent to the EU in 1999: “We will encourage U.S. 
organizations to enter the safe harbor as soon as possible to enhance privacy protection 
and because participation in the safe harbor provides greater certainty that data flows will 
continue without interruption.”124  Fifteen frequently asked questions (FAQs) are 
available on the DOC Safe Harbor website for companies interested in learning about all 
aspects of the Safe Harbor.125
The Safe Harbor website also includes a Safe Harbor Workbook, documents, 
public comments, and a Compliance Checklist for EU entities to review.126  Like the FTC 
website for the “Dewie” initiative, the Safe Harbor website contains a link geared 
specifically for privacy statements.127 The DOC also maintains a Safe Harbor list 
(“List”), which displays only those U.S. companies voluntarily participating in the Safe 
Harbor.128  The List helps EU entities involved in online transactions with U.S. 
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companies to ascertain whether U.S. companies are complying with “adequate” privacy 
protections. 
Both the FTC and DOC illustrate the commitment made by U.S. federal agencies 
in implementing the Safe Harbor. Working in a coordinated fashion to monitor 
“adequate” privacy protections within a traditionally sectoral regime, these two agencies 
are shaping U.S. privacy law to resemble EU comprehensive standards. This has much to 
do with the realization that maintaining data transfers between U.S. and EU entities is 
essential in preserving strong trade links. But aside from federal agencies changing 
existing privacy standards, States are also making great strides in contributing towards a 
more comprehensive privacy regime.
(E) CONTRIBUTING TO COMPREHENSIVENESS: MINNESOTA AND VERMONT 
 
Individual states are moving toward comprehensiveness by expanding privacy 
protections for personal data provided by state residents during online commercial 
transactions. However, this trend is not entirely equivalent to the EU definition of 
comprehensiveness. This is because all industries handling personal data within States 
still self-regulate without being subject to an overarching regime. Instead, there are 
stricter “adequate” standards being introduced. Nonetheless, this trend suggests that 
States are moving towards some form of comprehensiveness.
Minnesota’s adoption of the Internet Consumer Privacy Act (“ICPA”) in May 
2002 is a state initiative safeguarding the personal data of Minnesota consumers.129
Labeled as Chapter 395, the ICPA is the first law among the States requiring online 
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service providers to disclose their own information practices when receiving personal 
data from any Minnesota consumer.130 The ICPA also prohibits the use of “false or 
misleading” e-mail messages whereby a provider uses a consumer’s domain name 
without permission.131  Damages may be awarded in the amount of $25 for each e-mail, 
or $35,000 per day for a violation of the “false and misleading” provision.132
Article 1 of the ICPA provides that a Minnesota consumer is entitled to $500 or 
actual damages for a violation of Minnesota’s privacy laws.133  The ICPA also requires 
the initiator of an e-mail message to have a toll-free phone number or return e-mail 
address to give consumers a choice on whether to receive future e-mails.134  This 
requirement echoes the FTC Act’s ‘fair information practice’ of providing relevant 
contact information.135 The requirement also reflects the Safe Harbor “opt-out” option 
under the “Choice” Principle.136
Since March 1, 2003, the ICPA requires any online service provider soliciting 
business from Minnesota consumers to request direct authorization from the consumer to 
receive personal data.137 Moreover, the online service provider must explicitly mark e-
mail messages with “ADV” to give notice to the consumer that the provider intends to 
use its personal data with “adequate” privacy standards.138  This requirement parallels the 
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online privacy seal programs of TRUSTe and BBBOnline that require privacy seals on 
the website as evidence of meeting “adequate” privacy protection standards. 
The ICPA is significant in that privacy protections espoused by federal standards 
are being reinforced under state law. The ICPA also reflects the growing concern 
expressed by American consumers over personal data protections. As the ICPA’s 
legislative history suggests, Minnesota enacted privacy protections in response to 
concerns addressed by state residents over personal data collection practices of 
companies.139  The Minnesota legislation thus demonstrates how a State favors newer and 
tougher measures to protect personal data used in online commercial transactions.  
Like the Directive and the Safe Harbor’s principle of “Choice”, Vermont’s 
privacy law in the health sector emphasizes “opt-in” measures for the consumer.
Specifically, Vermont’s “opt-in” privacy law affords protection of personal health care 
data of Vermont residents.140  The “opt-in” law gives Vermont consumers the power to 
consent when disclosing personal data to relevant health authorities.141 Moreover, 
Vermont consumers are required to “opt-in” when disclosing information to third parties, 
such as marketers.142 Any party willfully disclosing personal health care data without the 
consumer’s consent will face civil penalties of no greater than $10,000.143
Although Vermont’s “opt-in” law is sectoral with respect to health care data 
protections, the law incorporates fundamental principles espoused in the Directive and 
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the Safe Harbor. These principles relate to greater transparency on the part of the online 
provider. Much like the Directive and the Safe Harbor, § 9471(a)(4) of the Vermont 
privacy law requires: “Identification of individuals who are authorized to disclose health 
care information.”144   That is, any party receiving sensitive personal data from Vermont 
consumers is required to clearly identify itself for accountability purposes. 
State legislatures are thus introducing more effective privacy controls over the 
content and use of personal data for state residents. Upon a review of the Minnesota and 
Vermont initiatives, specific elements of privacy protections found in the Directive and 
Safe Harbor are finding its way into state privacy laws. For instance, the Principle of 
“Choice” affords greater control over the content of personal data used in online 
transactions for consumers in both Minnesota and Vermont. But this trend in providing 
consumers with the power to regulate personal data within States is in response to a 
national concern expressed by American consumers over personal data protections.
 In a wider sense, this trend suggests that individual states are equal to the task in 
adopting more comprehensive privacy laws much like the federal government. As states 
launch programs designed to increase uniformity in the realm of privacy, a growing 
number of U.S. businesses are being encouraged to back such initiatives. A report by the 
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation illustrates this point: 
“As momentum grows in the State legislatures and agencies across America to regulate 
privacy, some companies that previously opposed Federal legislation . . . now support a 
uniform standard that clearly preempts these various, inconsistent State laws.”145
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Although these State privacy laws may be inconsistent in nature, each industry is 
adopting similar privacy standards that may eventually coalesce to establish an 
overarching regime. Even if an overarching regime does not materialize, there may be 
enough uniformity in privacy standards within each industry that closely resembles 
comprehensiveness.
VI. GLOBAL TREND TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE PRIVACY REGIME 
Many nations are adopting comprehensive privacy laws that reflect the principles 
of the Directive and Safe Harbor. For instance, Hong Kong introduced the Personal Data 
Privacy Ordinance (“Ordinance”) on January 30, 2001.146   The Ordinance regulates 
telecommunication services in direct marketing situations.147   Overlooking the 
Ordinance, the Hong Kong Productivity Council (under the authority of a Privacy 
Commissioner) refers to specific criteria in determining how personal data should be 
transferred from the Council to outside parties.148 Enforcement of privacy violations 
provides ‘data subjects’ with rights to correct inaccurate personal data.149 Such rights 
bear a striking resemblance to the Principle of “Access” in that it provides consumers 
with an opportunity to access and correct any relevant personal data that could be 
misused by outside parties. Like the Directive and to some extent the Safe Harbor, the 
Ordinance involves tight government controls on the transfer of personal data. 
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In 2000, Canada introduced the Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act  (PIPEDA).150   PIPEDA involves a three-stage implementation process: 
(1) on January 1, 2001, personal data of clients and employees are protected in federally 
regulated private industries such as airlines, broadcasting, and banking; (2) on January 1, 
2002, personal health data is protected; and (3) on January 1, 2004, PIPEDA standards 
will be binding on all Canadian provinces that “collect, uses or discloses” personal data 
in the course of commercial activities, whether or not the organization is federally 
regulated or not.151   The first stage imposes PIPEDA standards on organizations that 
disclose personal data of Canadian citizens outside the country.152 The federal 
government may exempt organizations from this implementation process if the 
commercial activity is within a province that adopts privacy legislation similar to that of 
the federal initiative.153
VII. CONCLUSION 
Comprehensiveness is defined as a broad scheme that enforces strict “adequate” 
standards for personal data handled by all industries under an overarching regime. Since 
the Directive’s adoption, five factors are shaping U.S. privacy laws to become more 
comprehensive in nature. First, the Directive is influencing U.S. privacy law in terms of 
setting a precedent for enforcing stricter privacy standards. Second, the influence of the 
Safe Harbor is such that it acts as a substitute for comprehensiveness in the U.S. privacy 
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regime. With widespread differences in privacy laws between the U.S. and the EU, the 
Safe Harbor serves as a useful intermediate link because it merges EU comprehensive 
privacy standards with U.S. sectoral standards. 
The third and fourth factors, respectively, relate to Congress’s growing concern 
over personal data protection, and States’ increasing recognition that similar protections 
should be afforded to its own residents. Specifically, Americans are growing wary of 
personal data protection from online providers. Such concerns are prompting Congress to 
adopt more comprehensive privacy legislation. Fifth, concern over billions of dollars 
worth of trade between the EU and the U.S. is forcing the U.S. to consider more 
comprehensiveness in streamlining commerce between the two entities. 
Over time, these five factors will gather momentum in helping shape a 
comprehensive regime within a system traditionally accustomed to a sectoral approach. 
Even if the EU version of comprehensiveness does not materialize in the U.S., it can be 
argued that various industries in the U.S. are adopting privacy standards so similar to EU 
standards that some form of comprehensiveness is being incorporated into a sectoral-
based regime. Nonetheless, with respect to U.S. privacy law, this type of regime acts as a 
benchmark from which interested parties and relevant authorities may curb misuse of 
online personal data. The advantage of a comprehensive privacy regime is that it ensures 
uniformity and certainty in protecting personal data for online commerce. 
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